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Lessons of the Past
As a gaming center, Las Vegas was
established by a collection of entrepreneurs
each developing various strategies to define
and promote their resorts, and over time
these have been emulated and refined and
are evident to this day.
The time of the early owners is defined by
Bernhard, Green and Lucas as the “Maverick
Period,” and this captures the essence of the
dynamism and creativity of the unorthodox
business leaders who pioneered many of the
early innovations.
Amongst those was Moe Dalitz, whose
interest in Las Vegas began in the 1940s with
the financing of the Desert Inn, an upscale
resort conceptually built on the strategy of
the Flamingo but with the notable
incorporation of a golf course on site in order
to attract the affluent guests who, like Dalitz,
were keen golfers.
Benny Binion influenced development of
his resorts from the perspective of a gambler.
By placing his name above the door he sought
to create a resort in his image, much like Bill
Harrah in Reno and Steve Wynn today.

“(Binion) ran the place on the theory that
every customer in there was somebody we
were trying to get to come back.” He offered
lower odds than his competitors and he
created the nicest environment to gamble,
including novelties such as carpeted floors
and air-conditioning.
Jay Sarno was an innovator in aspects of
theme and casino design. He moved away
from the motel model and was the first
developer to center all aspects of the resort
design in a wheel with the casino as a hub and
he looked at bringing in additional revenues
from alternative sources than gaming such as
those in the convention trade and nongamers who came to Las Vegas to see this
modern Greco-Roman incarnation.
As the manager of the Mint and Sahara, Sam
Boyd targeted traditional Vegas customers.
However, when operating his own casino, The
California (the Cal) he notably segmented
offering Hawaiian food, a more laid back
atmosphere and a packaged holiday service
from that island, building Boyd Gaming’s
success on Hawaiian customers. Sam’s Town
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catered specifically for local custom in Las
Vegas.
Meanwhile, outside of Las Vegas, Bill
Harrah was operating casino resorts in Reno
and Lake Tahoe, with “a solid understanding
of
the
gambling
business
and
opportunism….But Bill Harrah was able to
account for every quarter that passed
through his gambling halls and his operations
were successful.”
The Corporate Gaming Acts of 1967 and
1969 were instrumental in regulating the
industry with result being the development of
the modern casino resort, as initiated
between 1967 and 1975 by MGM’s Kirk
Kerkorian. The International, as designed by
Martin Stern Jr, was the first of the “Y-Shaped”
resorts, (which formed the basis of many of
the 1990s resorts) with multiple showrooms,
nightclubs and over 1,000 rooms.
Resorts of this era were, ”a glimpse into the
future of the casino resort: a large casino
surrounded by thousands of hotel rooms
geared towards the convention trade and
international patronage”.
“The conventional wisdom holds that the
Mirage hotel changed everything on the
Strip… when it opened on November 22,
1989…. (but) Wynn simply took the best of
what he learned from others in the Casino
business and put it all together in one
cohesive place.”
The opening of the Mirage is widely seen as
the marker when the naïve approaches of
resort operators met the world of corporate
finance, which led to the emergence of
structured operating frameworks, allowing
for institutional investment into the industry.
However, focusing on the Mirage alone
overlooks the contribution of a new
generation of managers who transformed Las
Vegas operations.
Armed with the work of modern
management tools, these new executives,
including Wynn, were able to reshape the city
as an entertainment capital with focus and
frameworks that have led to the city that
stands today.
Throughout the evolution of the city and
the historic positioning of Las Vegas’ resorts,

the operators succeeded in identifying their
customers and developed the offering
accordingly. This was innate to these early
developers who operated in a smaller,
simpler and more segmented market, with
the entire concepts for these resorts created
in the imaginations of their owners.

Adopting Frameworks
“An industry begins with the customer and
his or her needs, not with a patent, a raw
material, or a selling skill. Given the
customer’s needs, the industry develops
backwards, first concerning itself with the
delivery of customer satisfactions.”
Within Las Vegas there are many resorts in
a small amount of space. The market is
competitive and customer satisfaction levels
are high. The market offering has grown from
the bottom up rather than top down, leading
to the development of strategies formed on
the concept of the lifetime value of the
customer.
Customer Equity
“The lifetime value of a loyal customer can
be astronomical, especially when referrals are
added to the economics of customer retention
and repeat purchases of related products. For
example, the lifetime revenue stream from a
loyal pizza eater can be $8,000, a Cadillac
owner $332,000, and a corporate purchaser
of commercial aircraft literally billions of
dollars.”
This lifetime value of the customer is
defined as Customer Equity, within which are
three primary components- Value Equity,
Brand Equity and Retention Equity.
Value Equity is the relationship between
expectation and experience. In order to
enhance this area the company must give the
customer more of what they want or reduce
costs. This is particularly relevant in an area
of high exposure to competing products,
where the decision-making processes are
complex and where there are high levels of
innovation evident, such as within the luxury
sector of Las Vegas resorts. Quality, service
delivery, price and convenience are key.
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Brand Equity is “the portion of the
Customer Equity attributable to the brand”
and is important where there are low
involvement decisions with highly visible
products, where there is longevity in the
consumption and difficulty in evaluating the
product before use. With reference to the
research question, this is of lesser importance,
however the development of brands, such as
Caesars Palace, The Bellagio, Hard Rock and
Planet Hollywood can imply an aspirational
or self-segmenting aspect of decision-making.
The third component is Retention Equity.
Once a customer has engaged with a company
or product the relationship must be
developed for retention; “Building retention
impact can take many forms. A firm can
provide additional benefits that make it more
costly for the customer to switch to a
competitor….a firm can reward behaviors
that enhance retention (such as) rewarding
purchase transactions...monetary value of
transactions...or even length of consumption
experience (and) strengthening the emotional
relationship with the customer through
emotional ties may be the most effective in
building Retention Equity.”
Within Las Vegas the drivers of Retention
Equity are loyalty programs, special
recognition and treatment programs, affinity
programs and community programs.

Managing The Customer As An Asset
“Managing the customer as an asset is more
critical to a firms success than ever before for
three reasons. First, marketers who take an
asset based view of the customer make better
decisions than those who limit themselves to
product brand or transaction views. Second,
today’s computing technology makes precise
customer asset management possible….
Finally, changes in market conditions, driven
by advances in information systems,
communications and production, will help
companies that understand and manage the
values of each international customer to
overtake, and then displace, mass marketers.”
Blattberg’s thesis features the several stage
customer lifecycle where customers are:
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Prospects, First Time Buyers, Early Repeat
Buyers, Core Customers and Core Defectors.
Based on the 2011 LVCVA figures, only 16%
were first time visitors to Las Vegas and in
the past 5 years over 80% of visitors were
repeat visitors. This indicates that the
majority of visitors have a realizable longterm value if they could be retained by the
operators.
Blattberg focuses on key customer
retention over generic loyalty, justifying the
nuance on the value of some customers
compared to others with a lower value. This
is particularly valid in the gaming industry
and several of the resort operators have
developed positions based on the nature of
the customer’s decision making.
He further notes that customer retention
strategies should be created during the initial
customer acquisition. He identifies three
types of customer - the committed loyal
customer, the customer who continues
purchasing a product, but is vulnerable to
alternative offers and the defector.

Generic Competitive Strategies
In his seminal text, Competitive Strategy,
Porter identifies the generic strategies of
Overall Cost Leadership and Differentiation,
however there are problems in applying
these holistically to Las Vegas as various
segments are targeted, where operators seek
differentiation as well as cost leadership in
room rates. Within the core product –
gambling, a low cost leadership approach is
difficult as there can be little variance in the
price of a bet (although through discounts
and offers, the benefits offered may offer
effective discounts on the price of a bet, or the
odds may differ slightly). The secondary
product - the room, may be a price leader, but
if room rates are reduced too low, the value
proposition disappears. Facing the intense
competition seen in the current economic
downturn, many resorts have not operated
rooms profitably.
As noted previously, a key aspect of Las
Vegas
development
has
been
in
differentiation and where the product is
generic a producer or operator must seek to
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create differentiation around the core
product, whether by creating a theme, brand
or other aspect, but some aspects have
greater value to different customers.
Strategy Implementation: Inside-Out vs.
Outside-In
In implementing differentiation strategies,
Treacy and Wiersema take the view that a
company determines what segment they wish
to target, then develops a business strategy to
suit accordingly.
“No company today can succeed by being all
things to all people, it must instead find that
unique value that it alone can deliver to a
chosen market...The first value discipline we
call operational excellence… the second value
we call product leadership…the third we have
named customer intimacy.”
Much of these strategies are dictated by
business capabilities and evidence of this
approach is seen throughout Las Vegas.
Contrary to this Inside-Out view is the
Outside-In approach as advocated by Day and
Moorman;
“Inside-Out companies narrowly frame
their strategic thinking by asking “What can
the market do for us?” rather than, “What can
we do for the market?”. The consequences of
Inside-Out versus Outside-In thinking can be
seen in the way many business-to-business
firms approach customer solutions. The
Inside-Out view is that solutions “are bundles
of product and services that help us sell more.
“The outside-in view is that “the purpose of a
solution is to help our customers find value
and make money- to our mutual benefit” (See
Figure 1).
In order to pursue an Outside-In strategy, a
company must have real insights into the
market by being aware of both customer
behavior and competitor movement. Thanks
to technologies such as the internet, loyalty
cards and customer tracking, this is now
achievable.
In implementation, a company must look at
how they offer value to customers - the
customer is viewed as a business asset with
value. Harrah’s/Caesars collected customer

data to determine their customer base and
sought to develop relationships in order to
understand the motivations of non-core
clients and increase their customer value by
rewarding customer behavior. The outcomes
of this successful Outside-In strategy allowed
Caesars to expand efficiently and increase
profits from $102m in 1998 to $398m in
2005.
Day and Moorman further develop their
platform to include value leadership, which
includes product innovation, developing the
brand in order to seize focus and initiative in
the sector.

Understanding Loyalty
Ayling (2006) notes four types of loyalty.
Contractual Loyalty is based on a formal
agreement, which is not applicable in this
type of relationship.
Transactional Loyalty is identified as
loyalty based on price, value and convenience.
This is easily to stimulate using rewards and
benefits and is prevalent throughout Las
Vegas particular by Caesars and MGM.
Functional Loyalty is based where the
product differentiates or is perceived to be
superior, offers a particular benefit or where
the customer associates with that particular
product. This is evident in the case of some of
the MGM resorts where the resorts are
targeted for segments, or the Wynn and
Venetian, which are aspirational resorts, thus
Functional Loyalty and resort positions are
set to align.
Finally, Emotional Loyalty is based on an
appeal to values. Whilst this may apply within
retail, this is an unlikely source of loyalty
within the gaming environment, unless the
source is of an intangible nature, like a “lucky”
casino or where a uniquely positive
experience occurred, such as a wedding or
engagement proposal.
Unlike
conventional
loyalty,
where
investment is made to attract initial
customers, the challenge to the operators is
on customer retention and it is this area
(transactional loyalty) where the operators
focus most of their effort, once customer
value has been identified.
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Strategic Loyalty
The gaming sector realized the benefits of
transactional loyalty and on-going customer
value early and since delivered ways to
harness this.
The concept of player clubs and customer
tracking
grew
from
this
sector.
Harrah’s/Caesars growth is seen as the
market benchmarks in this field. Today all
operators operate player clubs, but not all use
the Harrah’s/Caesars analytical approach
using customer behavior to develop their
strategies from an Outside-In perspective, or
use the data to try and engender some form
of incentive to focus spending on a particular
resort or generate reward.

Behind the Curtains
There is a misconception that operating a
casino is a license to print money, however
the evidence shows a more nuanced picture,
particularly when one looks at Las Vegas in
entirety (See Figures 2, 3)
After a sustained period of growth, gaming
revenues on the Las Vegas Strip fell sharply in
2007. This coincided with an expansion of
supply in the market, with City Center (5,800
rooms), Cosmopolitan (3,000 rooms), Encore
(2,000 rooms) and Palazzo (3,000 rooms)
opening between 2007 and 2011 and over
9,000
rooms
withdrawn
aborted
developments Fontainebleau (3,889 rooms)
and Echelon (5,300 rooms).
This shift has led to a refocusing on the
market in an attempt for the operators to not
just capture new customers but also to
develop an emphasis on loyalty in order to
preserve market share.
From 1984 to 1999 gaming returns were
the dominant source of revenue for casino
resorts but in 1999 combined non-gaming
revenues exceeded those of gaming revenues.
Much of this change comes from the
development of the Strip resorts. 1999
marked the opening on the Venetian and the
first anniversary of the Bellagio, which were
the first mega resorts catering for a high end
clientele.
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Gaming
Although declining, at 38.2% (c. $5bn) of
total revenue, gaming is still the largest single
source of income and the catalyst that has
enabled the development of the modern Las
Vegas casino resort.
Casino games fall into several categories.
There are table games of chance, (roulette,
baccarat and craps) games where skill
reduces the odds, (poker and blackjack) and
fixed odds games, where the distribution is
predefined at a percentage of receipts (slots)
Based on probability, the house advantage
ensures that casinos will win over time. This
advantage to the house is known as the hold,
the theoretical win or the expected value (EV)
and the greater the EV the higher the house
margin.

Rooms
Little research is available on the evolution
of the casino resort room, however whilst
high roller rooms were always notable for
their opulence, the focus of resort developers
was not on the emphasis of the rooms until
the development of the Rio and latterly
Venetian which sought to use rooms to
differentiate from other Strip operators in the
convention market and offered all-suite
resorts with the smallest room at 650sqft.
Since this period and the subsequent
development of strip resorts between 20052011, standard strip resort rooms have
become larger and better equipped. Whereas
rooms were “comped” or sold at discount in
the past, today as noted above in Chart 3,
rooms provide the second largest component
of strip resort revenues today.
Food, Beverage and Nightclubs
Las Vegas has become a key culinary
destination in recent years with 21 Michelin
Stars found in 16 restaurants on the Strip
alone. These may be appealing to a high-end
segment seeking a unique experience, but one
can stay and play at one resort and dine at
another and it is rare that a restaurant is a
source of competitive advantage.
In terms of total returns, nightclub
revenues are small, but there are reputational
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benefits and the opportunity to attract certain
customer segments with a successful
operation.
Entertainment
Las Vegas is a destination brand identified
with entertainment.
Across the city, showrooms feature
Broadway
musicals,
international
entertainers and production shows. Analysis
of the performers is based on ticket sales and
also per capita casino “drop” their
performances produce.
Today, resorts use entertainment not just as
a differentiator and profit center, but also as a
brand enhancer to align fans of the artist and
resort. This is notable across demographics,
with rockers such as Motley Crue taking a
mini-residency at Hard Rock and Caesars’
headliners appeal to an older market segment
with Celine Dion, Elton John, Rod Stewart and
Shania Twain presently on rotation, artists
with their own customer base, cachet and
brand value cross leverage their value with
the resort.

Players Clubs
“(Gary) Loveman noted that Harrah’s
gamblers spent only thirty-six cents of every
wagering dollar at Harrah’s…If he could get
them to spend just one penny (more) of every
wagered dollar at Harrah’s, Harrah’s annual
earnings would jump by more than a dollar a
share.”
Harrah’s/Caesars adopted several of the
frameworks as previously discussed around
the topics of customer lifetime value and
created a tiered player’s club, Total Rewards,
which would monitor customer behavior
including regularity of play, average spend
and in the case of slots, the velocity of play
(how fast the customer pushed the button!).
This also allowed the company to tailor
promotions for the customer and monitor
performance versus probability.
Today all leading resorts operate player
clubs. Wynn operates Red, LVS have Grazie,

MGM operate M life, Cosmopolitan has
Identity and Boyd Gaming uses B Connected.
Leading players clubs can be used across
retail platforms, e.g. Total Rewards can be
used with retailers as diverse as Apple and
Avon.

“Comps”
Early casinos gave away drinks to playing
customers and by the end of the 1950s, RFB
comps were usual for most playing customers.
What was intended to be a privilege became
commonplace and “casinos use comps as a
marketing device to generate business and
management can evaluate this marketing tool
by determining the effect of the comp policy
on the drop.”
In recent years, with the advent of loyalty
schemes and the ability to track play,
operators can accurately garner a player’s
theoretical value and reward play-time
accordingly, based on the mathematics, but
customers now expect comps and demand
them; in 2011, $1.2bn (25.9%) of casino
resort expenses were allocated as comps,
slightly under payroll expenditure.
Service
From the mid-90s onwards and originating
from the celebrated article, “Putting The
Service-Profit Chain To Work” the prevailing
wisdom was that with top tier service, not
only can loyalty be achieved, but also the
customer will be an advocate or “apostle” for
the service provider.
Whilst this can be true in some industries
and although universal good service may
have been possible in Las Vegas of yesteryear,
in resorts with 3,000-8,000 rooms and 5,00016,000 guests per night, customers have high
levels of expectation to be managed.
The use of databases and identifying
customer equity allowed operators to identify
different values and needs of their guests,
therefore they could efficiently deploy the
levels of service needed to achieve retention,
loyalty or to avoid defection, and develop a
proposition appropriate to value of the
customer.
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A consequence was the raising of standards
for mass market gaming consumers, high
levels of service are a basic expectation in all
resorts. Thus the customer service inflation
evident prompts the question of whether
competitive advantage is really to be gained
by offering such high levels of service. Rather,
having raised expectations, there may be a
cost to not meeting the customer’s
expectation, particularly in the highest end of
the market.

Who Are the Customers?
During the course of this research we
undertook primary research, which holds a
confidence level of 95% and a confidence
interval of 4.25%
Our dataset shared much of the profile of
the LVCVA sample; c.90% of respondents
were repeat visitors. 50% had visited over 5
times in the past 5 years.
We developed a detailed profile of various
customers and their requirements.
26% of visitors are fairly, but not totally
loyal (where loyalty is being measured as
repeat patronage) and 65% actively stay in
different resorts, therefore suggesting within
the Las Vegas market, the majority of
customers do not currently display loyalty in
terms of repeat patronage. Indeed, even the
“fairly loyal customers” like to try somewhere
new.
Of those that always stay in the same resort,
we note that the most frequently visited
resorts were The Wynn and Flamingo (17%)
and Caesars Palace, Mirage, Encore, MGM
Grand and the Mandalay Bay (14%).
Of the visitors who have stayed over 5
times, 22.6% say that they always stay in the
same resort and 66% mainly stay the same
resort but occasionally try somewhere. This is
more than just repeat patronage and is
indicative of loyalty, but also indicates a
desire to seek different experiences.
Therefore we can assume that the more
frequent and experienced the guest is, the
greater the chance they have of finding a
resort that they prefer, but will still continue
to seek different experiences
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In order to understand why there were
such high satisfaction ratings and repeat
custom to Las Vegas we asked a series of
questions relating to services facilities and
expectations:
The majority of visitors who come to Las
Vegas have high expectations; irrespective of
price, first class service is expected and the
facilities must be market leading.
Moreover, only a small minority have not
had their expectations met.
We asked respondents which of these
influenced the resort that they stayed in and
if they were Key, Important, Taken Into
Consideration or Not Relevant.
(See Figure 4)
Thus we identify the main drivers in
influencing customers’ decision-making.
For 91% of respondents price is important,
for 43.3% it is key and only 7.3% of
customers who claim price is not important.
On the theme of price we asked if level of
“comp” affects where the customer stays, to
which 59.8% said it was relevant and 40.2%
said it was of no relevance.
Therefore, despite all the differentiation
strategies, customers are generally price
sensitive and a slight majority are highly
sensitive to their “comp”.
17.4% of the respondents had hosts, which
is a small but significant minority at it
identifies those customers with an existing
relationship.
A small majority of customers with hosts
either always stay in the same resort (27.6%)
or mainly, stay in the same resort (26.2%),
thus we note that those customers with a host
are significantly more loyal than those
without, however there was little loyalty to
the particular host, with only 10.7% of
respondents claiming to move resorts if their
host moved.
The Total Rewards players club is the
largest (70% of visitors hold the card), but
MGM’s M life has gained significant traction
since its launch with 67.8%. Wynn Red and
Grazie are held by 43.3% and 40.3% of
customers, respectively.
The data further suggests that Total
Experiences card-holders hold cards from
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other resorts; of Total Rewards card holders
83% hold Mlife cards, 53% hold Grazie, 54%
have Red and 27% are members of another
players club.
Total Rewards cardholders are also more
likely to be regular visitors to Las Vegas 67% have visited over 5 times compared to
the average of 55% of general visitors.
Of those who were not members of any
players club, most were infrequent visitors
with 38.5% only having been once and the
same amount having visited twice or three
times in the past 5 years.
Of those who were not members of players
clubs, 50.1% were under 35, compared to the
sample total of 34.4% within that age range.

Segmentation Analysis- Customers’ Gambling
Habits
Unsurprisingly, a disproportionate amount
of those regularly visiting casinos at home
have been to Las Vegas over 5 times in the
past 5 years (65%). In terms of their
influences, player clubs (44%) and resort
location (50%) have the highest significance
for this segment and the Flamingo is the most
popular resort (which may because of comps
or offers through player clubs).
Those who never visit local casinos, cite
bedroom quality (50%) and resort
appearance (53%) as key in influencing their
decision-making.
Almost 90% of frequent gamers are Total
Rewards cardholders and only 75% M life
holders. Within this segment, 75% are
influenced where they stay by the size of their
“comp”, which proves that the value of the
comps to the gaming segment as players are
evidently lured by incentives.
When we cross-reference this data with the
LVCVA findings, we note that there is a
marked decline in average gaming spend per
customer. This leads us to ask whether the
“traditional” gaming customers are gambling
less or if the overall increase in visitor
numbers, including non-gamers, is skewing
the figures. The answers will be held by the
operators’ datasets, but will have real value in
determining the extent of the shift in value
between gaming and non-gaming customers.

Segmentation Analysis - Duration
We examined if there were significant
differences based on duration of trip in Las
Vegas, but there was nothing notable in the
majority of the findings. With those staying
over 5 days on an average trip, there were no
dominating factors influencing decisionmaking, with bedroom quality only slightly
above the average.
For those staying longer, price sensitivity is
a greater issue and the level of “comps” is
significantly less important.
27.9% of visitors staying for over 5 days
were from Europe and 16.0% from Canada,
compared to 13.6% and 9.42% from the
respective countries within the sample.
Segmentation Analysis - Budgets
We filtered the findings based on the level
of spend to identify any noticeable trends.
The key finding is that for those with a
smaller budget, resort price is of real
importance as 72.1% state that price is the
key determinant of decision making, versus
the average of 43.3%.
Those on a small budget are less likely to be
a member of a players club (and therefore not
tracked) and are more likely to be influenced
by a deal on social media. This segment is
slightly younger than the rest of the sample.
Those who spent £5,000-10,000 were more
likely than average to be loyal to an individual
resort and are typically more demanding of
the facilities on offer.
73.6% of this segment hold membership of
the MGM Players Club, M life, compared to the
sample average of 67.8% and are tone of few
segments more likely to be members of Mlife
than Total Rewards. They are less likely to be
influenced by offers on social media (58%)
and 23.6% say that price is unimportant,
compared to the average of 7.34%. This tells
us that in the medium range and largest
segment, MGM Resorts are a preferred
operator with a price premium associated.
Of those with a budget of $10,000 and
upward there are some interesting trends.
This segment are three times more likely to
have stayed in Caesars Palace (63.6%) than
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the average (27.2%) proving that Caesars
Palace still has the power to attract (or
target) larger gamers. For this segment
72.7% say that bedroom quality is the key
influence in choosing the resort (sample
average is 41.8%) and friendliness of staff is
significantly above the average (36.4% to
28.5%) in the key influences. They place
significant importance to star rating of the
resort (81.9% say it is either key or important,
compared to the sample average of 50.3%) as
they only to want a premium experience and
the star rating gives external validation of this.
Whilst none say room price is key in
making the decision 54.5% say it is important,
so price remains a determinant even in this
segment.
Of spenders of more than £10,000, 72.4%
have a host, (compared to the average of
17.4%) but there is a lower than average
membership of players clubs, with the
exception of the Wynn Players Club - Red, at
54.5% compared to 43.3% on average. This
may be because of the integrated room
key/players club card that the Wynn operates,
compared to a separate card so there is no
requirement to physically join the players
club.
81.2% of this segment is influenced by the
levels of their “comp”.
54.5% say that nightclubs are key or
important, compared to the sample average
of 8.64%. 36.4% of this high expenditure
bracket is aged 29-34 and 54.5% are from
outside the USA. 36.4% of these players state
they never visit a casino in their home
jurisdiction, which is above the sample
average of 23.1%.
Thus, for the segment spending over
$10,000
the
overall
experience
is
substantially more important than just
gambling.
Segmentation Analysis- Age
Within the youngest age group, (21 – 28) it
is unsurprising to note that this group have
visited less frequently than the overall sample,
but a similar amount state that they plan to
return within the next 12 months. Within this
sector the MGM Grand is the most frequented
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resort. This group has higher than average
expectations in the facilities (74.1%).
In understanding what influences this
segment we note that the range of bars is a
higher priority (47.7% key or important)
than average (28.3%), the bedroom quality is
slightly more key or important than average
(90.6% to 85.0%), just outside the margin of
error.
Significantly, nightclubs are disproportionately attractive to this segment
(45.3% to 1.4%) and both the swimming pool
and themes are slightly more important than
average, however the odds on the tables are
of less relevance.
This segment is significantly less likely to be
a member of a player club with over 25% not
being a member of any, compared to a sample
average of 15.6%
Otherwise, the spending patterns of this
group do not alter significantly from the
sample average.
Ages 29-35 are also are slightly less inclined
to be members of a players club and do not
differ from the sample average in any
significant way, other than a slightly higher
importance placed on the range of
restaurants in a resort.
The 35-45 profile are slightly more likely to
try different resorts (65.3%) to (62.6%) and
therefore more keen on experimenting than
average, however they are slightly more
likely than average to be members of players
clubs, but notably 73.9% are members of
Mlife and 71.8% are members of Total
Rewards.
The decision-making influences do not
differ from average in many ways; however
this segment is more aware of the odds and
limits of bets than the average and is
probably less keen to play in lower odd
environments seeking preferable odds and
bets which are aligned with their budgets.

The segment aged 46-59 visits Las Vegas
more frequently than others, with 66.9%
having visited over 5 times in the past 5 years,
compared to 55.7% in the sample. This
segment is more pragmatic, expecting less
than average in terms of service and facilities,

[10]

Occasional Papers | Center for Gaming Research | University of Nevada, Las Vegas

but still has over 90% satisfaction ratings. For
this segment, price is less of a key influencer
(37.3%) than average (43.3%), but a higher
percentage are members of players clubs.
Within this segment most key influences in
decision-making were slightly below the
average indicating a less polarized decision
making process. However, 61.0% of
respondents believed that the Players Club
element was either a key or important
influencer in decision-making, compared to
the average of 55.7%.
96.3% of 46-59 year olds plan to return to
Las Vegas within 12 months.
64% of the over 60s have visited Las Vegas
over 5 times in the past 5 years and all are
multiple visitors. This segment is more loyal
(12%) always stay in the same resort, but
32% are willing to try something new.
With this segment key influences are not so
pronounced with bedroom quality the key
influence, less a factor than the average.
However, poker was important for 28% of the
respondents as were the odds on the table
games.
For this segment gambling is still
significantly important, including players
clubs, which are a key influencer for 44% of
this segment, compared to 27% of the sample.
This segment tends to stay in Las Vegas for
longer than average; 40% stay over 5 days
compared to a sample average of 27%. 100%
of all respondents within this segment plan to
return to Las Vegas within the next 12
months.
The most valuable customers are those who
have been to Las Vegas on multiple visits and
either always or mainly stay in the same
resort and we define these as frequent loyal
customers (FLCs)
Only looking at key factors in their decisionmaking, the friendliness of staff is more
important in this segment than the average
(35.8% to 28.5%) as are player clubs (35.2%
to 27.0%), whilst 12% cite luck as key when
choosing a resort. Resort location was slightly
less important for FLCs at 49.1% to 53.8%
average.
For FLCs, price was less a key concern than
the average (36.5% to 43.3%).

Curiously, FLCs are less likely than average
to be members of a players club, but 27.8%
have a host compared to 17.4% on average.
Total Rewards was the most widely held card.
67% of FLCs were from the USA (excl.
Nevada and California) and 10.2% from
Canada.
FLCs are likely to spend more on the visits,
with 22.5% of respondents having a budget of
over $5,000 compared to 15.8% of those
respondents. 94.6% plan to return to Las
Vegas within 12 months.
In concluding our customer analysis, we
note that 26% of visitors are fairly, but not
totally loyal, and that 65% are active in
choosing different resorts each visit.

Strategy in Action
So how do the operators, with a similar
range of limited marketing options affect
strategic advantage?
They all have players clubs, hosts, offer a
wide range of facilities and advertise in key
markets. They offer a similar broad range of
facilities, dining and entertainment options,
some of which are used as key marketing
attributes. All the major resorts profess to be
customer service market leaders.
Where the resorts differ is in how they
approach the customer value proposition; are
these operators offering an Inside-Out or an
Outside-In strategy and moreover, are these
effective in achieving loyalty?

Resorts Adopting the Outside-In Approach
To develop a successful Outside-In
approach, resorts must have the ability to
capture customer data and be able to make
decisions based on their market, and be able
to develop customer value and profitability
through loyalty. We note two prime examples
of this approach in Las Vegas operators.
The foremost example of Outside-In
adoption in Las Vegas is Caesars, who built
their success on the ability to capture
customer data from Total Rewards users and
develop an offering for their customers with
an aim of increasing visitation.
For a sustained period it looked that this
strategy was successful, but in the extreme
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competitive environment of recent years,
when faced by competitors creating
additional high-end (and superior) room
inventory, developing new leisure facilities,
replicating Total Rewards by developing their
own players clubs (albeit with less
functionality, but this is of no concern to the
customer) and price reductions across the
city, this strategy alone needs revisiting.
Similarly, Wynn Resorts have taken a
similar view. Whilst it is unlikely Mr. Wynn
himself
visits
and
experiences
the
competition within Las Vegas, it is clear that
his team do. With the benefit of an integrated
room card and players club, the customer can
be (and is) tracked in the Wynn properties
with a comprehensive dataset obtained.
Wynn’s value proposition is to be the
leading luxury provider, so within a limited
pre-defined market, they can harness
customer
expectation
and
develop
capabilities to meet this.

Resorts Adopting the Inside-Out Approach
Within MGM’s portfolio, we can see all
strategies evident, from the Bellagio
advocating Product Leadership, Aria focusing
on Customer Intimacy (within an identified
segment) and several resorts showing
Operational Excellence, which is reflected in
price and position, based on the management
strategically developing strategies for each
resort.
The other resorts that do not operate on a
portfolio basis adopt a particular strategy.
Newer
resorts,
such
as
The
Venetian/Palazzo and The Cosmopolitan have
sought to develop the best product for their
markets and have attracted both praise and a
strong position in their market segment.
The legacy resorts have had a challenge to
successfully rebrand and find a segment to
attract. Frequently there is a default position
of developing a cost-leadership strategy,
where price rather than attributes play a
dominant role. However, this has become a
zero-sum-gain as when rooms sell below cost,
both the proposition and the bottom line are
diminished.
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Those resorts that have had the ability to
rebrand and successfully identify market
segments have performed well. An example is
the Hard Rock Hotel which developed a
customer intimacy strategy, where although
there are “better” or cheaper alternatives,
there is alignment from customer to brand
offering the customer values and service
customization.

Las Vegas Operators’ Strategies for
Competitive Advantage
Las Vegas has expectation inflation, with
64% of respondents believing service should
be first class irrespective of budget and a
similar number deeming that facilities in Las
Vegas should be market leading. We also note
that only 39% of those respondents have had
experiences that matched their expectations.

Caesars Entertainment
Total Rewards allowed Caesars to gain a
competitive advantage on its rival operators
for many years, but this is rapidly eroding
due to availability of other CRM software and
the emergence of other players clubs, such as
M life. Caesars calculate the customer’s
Average Daily Worth (ADW) and based on
this initial criteria, to determine if the
customer is a low, high or ultra-high value
player. Analysis is done on age, location and
on inclining or declining spending patterns,
with a focused investment based on these
patterns to increase ADW by adding
incremental spend. 80% of play is tracked.
In recent years, Caesars has sought to
maximize the information within the
database, with such a focus on adding
additional revenues, there was evidence that
service proposition to the high-rolling gaming
demographic suffered, with much of this
custom migrating. Moves to expand Total
Rewards outside of gaming and into retail
partnerships may be an interesting corporate
strategy, but may offer limited value, in
particular to younger demographics who are
not incentivized by incremental discounting.
Acknowledging the rise of non-gaming
visitors to Las Vegas, Caesars has focused on
attracting this segment. Total Experiences, a
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group planning service was established and
significant resources have been directed to
Project Linq, an open-air pedestrian area in
the center of the Strip. As location is
important to many visitors, this should not
just drive revenue, but re-orientate footfall
from competing attractions on the Strip.
With capex cycles typically longer than
other resorts and the development boom
increasing quality inventory in the city this
may pose a structural problem for the
operator.
Caesars has sought to take advantage of
portfolio commonalities as a way of gaining
competing advantage and increase cross
selling. This form of loyalty is transactional,
where benefits can be obtained by
aggregating operational elements, such as the
Buffet of Buffets (a 24 hour buffet pass for
$45), All Stage Pass (tickets to 20+ shows for
$99) and All Night Pass (7 nightclubs for $45).
Caesars focus on their branded offering,
seeking to align particular brands with
market segments, including The Pussycat
Dolls, Planet Hollywood and celebrity chefs,
including Gordon Ramsey and Guy Savoy. As
owners of the WSOP brand, Caesars has
access to an important market segment and
when online gaming is legalized, there will be
an ideal opportunity to align Total Rewards
points with online play as well as the
traditional land based gaming.
Caesars also believe that loyalty can be
achieved through the individually focused
benefits and status that can be earned from
the Total Rewards program. Caesars use their
size, scope and scale to offer a broad, yet
focused, strategy based on aspiration and
accessibility with benefits and experience
based rewards.
MGM Resorts
The MGM portfolio of resorts is run
independently with some resorts clearly
operating in segments and others more
generic.
M life has sought to improve customer
transactional loyalty by integrating customer
spend and cross-promotion. For a short
period, a focus was to divert customers to

Aria, but evidence was that whilst they liked
elements of the City Center offering, existing
customers reverted to their previous
preferences, which (notably the Mirage and
MGM) have functional loyalty.
A feature of MGM’s Las Vegas offering is
that the resorts are competing against other
properties within the group; the target
demographic is similar for Aria, MGM and
Mandalay Bay and The Luxor, Mirage and
MGM are in a similar space, as are Circus
Circus and Excalibur.
As an operator, there is no holistic bid for
competitive advantage in a single segment,
rather through a diverse offering MGM can
target every element of the market, whilst
maintaining a room offering that retails above
cost.

Las Vegas Sands
LVS has achieved competitive advantage in
two ways. Firstly, by seeking a nonconventional business model in conception,
where gaming was not the intended primary
driver and the lodging offering was superior
in terms of size and amenity than the preexisting market which was ideal for corporate
and convention travelers. It was brand and
theme focused, with a strategy encouraging
older leisure visitors for a recreational, retail
and leisure experience. In this sense, The
Venetian was the first fully integrated
purpose built Las Vegas resort.
Secondly, the pioneering drive into Asia has
served the LVS’ Las Vegas resorts well, as this
has provided it with access to the highly
lucrative Asian market, similar to Boyd’s
Hawaiian strategy. The Asian hosts have been
integrated into their overall gaming service
and LVS brings customers from Singapore
and Macau to the USA, where there is a
preferable tax environment for gaming. 60%
of all LVS’ gaming revenue is from table
games and is dominated by baccarat revenues,
the game of preference for many Asian
players.
While LVS dominates this Asian market,
they will have a discernible competitive
advantage over their Las Vegas rivals as they
have emotional loyalty (a perception of luck)
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with the industry’s most profitable customers,
which is difficult to achieve.
Wynn Resorts
Wynn Resorts are committed to excellence
as their key metric and they believe that
understanding their customers allows them
to provide the highest standards of service
and facilities.
The quality of room product continues to be
a competitive advantage and their room
renovation program is more frequent than
any other Las Vegas operator, which is why
Wynn commands a price premium on room
rates.
It is unlikely that the levels of service are
indeed a differentiator (as all the similar
focused operators have similarly high
standards) but the personification of brand
Wynn is unique and non-replicable. Whereas
Wynn previously used art to create a unique
perception, The Wynn is an embodiment of
global excellence in a hotel resort. It has
aligned with super luxury brands such as
Ferrari, who have a showroom in the resort,
but also seeking to target the older US gaming
demographic who align with the nostalgia of
the Sinatra era.
Wynn studies customer data to determine
trends and continually uses this data to
improve their offering. They use the business
information to target their marketing, if not in
the form of free rooms as seen in Caesars but
by issuing invitations and offering unique
experiences to customers.
In terms of capturing loyalty, the view was
that loyalty was transactional, bought by
segment and in value through comps.
However, research suggests that Wynn
actually has functional loyalty from its
customers, but even then, The Wynn has to be
as competitive as even loyal satisfied
customers migrate.
The Independent Resorts
The independent resorts have limited
methods to obtain sustainable competitive
advantage for the entire market, but within
segments and sub-segments, effective
campaigns can be seen.
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In early 2011, the large resorts were fearful
of the effect that the Cosmopolitan was going
to have on their business. It was smart,
different, had a strong management team and
fresh ideas. By 2012 the fears had been
unrealized.
The Cosmopolitan’s differentiation strategy
was to be a non-casino casino, which was
aspirational, sleek and alternative, resonating
with customers on an emotional level. The set
out to create new luxury, compared to the
likes of the Venetian and Wynn, with cool art
and fresh retail offerings.
Whilst Cosmopolitan has been successful in
branding and positioning, it has done so in a
space where the customers are not traditional
gamblers and are therefore not profitable. It
is in direct competition with the MGM
portfolio, who have the advantage of an
established database and players club and to
a limited extent Wynn Encore.
TI is one of the older properties and its
main differentiator today is price, as
compared to its neighbors on the North Strip
it is significantly cheaper. For a time it was
family friendly with a traditional pirate theme,
then a raunchy pirate theme as it skewed
towards the nightclub crowd but this was not
successful for a sustainable period.
Hard Rock Hotel has successfully exploited
a brand to create an alternative offering. The
Rehab pool party has developed notoriety
even
in
the
somewhat
permissive
environment of Las Vegas and HRH continues
to develop this unorthodox and wild
narrative. This is to be further developed with
a tequila shot on arrival and Bloody Mary on
departure, which will attract a particular
segment that other resorts probably do not
seek to attract. The culture and paradigm
created by the fusion of brand and operation
may prove this strategy effective and whilst
those partaking in the experience consent
and contribute, this may prove a competitive
strategy that is both sustainable and
achievable.
The Tropicana has undergone a substantial
makeover to a bright, creatively styled resort
with a country club atmosphere. However,
the target market segment of mid-priced
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traveler and smaller conventions has
substantial competition and even with a
comparatively priced product, there may not
enough to differentiate the offering from the
rest of the market.
The Downtown resorts have the slight
advantage that they are operating in a smaller
sub-market, with The Plaza and Golden
Nugget in competition as the premier resorts
Downtown. In terms of location, they are at a
disadvantage to strip resorts for the high
rollers, but there is plenty of alternative
business.
The Palms is dual segmented, offering
looser slots than the strip resorts (which is a
competitive advantage for the local players)
and aligned branding with MTV. For a period
the Palms Resort was the ‘hip’ place, however
that has been superseded by the
Cosmopolitan and Hard Rock, who have
targeted and captured the Palms’ clients with
a newer offering.
Las Vegas is a uniquely competitive market
place, with operators using many tools to try
and capture market share and repeat custom.

Developing Competitive Advantage
Las Vegas is a unique destination. It is
highly competitive and can be a highly
profitable business environment with
successful operators sharing the revenue
increases from $2bn in 1984 to over $14bn
today.
In our research we analyzed customer
decision-making and it is evident that the four
key influences in decision making affecting a
weighting of over 70% in the key and
important factors were, resort location,
bedroom quality, resort appearance and
friendliness of staff.
Based on our research we reach four
conclusions for operators:
Focus
A multi-segment focus is no longer
sustainable and a clear plan for holistic
differentiation based on market segmentation
must be adopted.
The importance of understanding the
history and evolution of Las Vegas cannot be

understated as the experience has moved full
circle. We note the early operators developed
resorts from an Inside-Out perspective
catering for different defined segments, such
as Dalitz’s Desert Inn, Binion’s Horseshoe and
Sarno’s Circus Circus spectacle.
These resorts were successful because the
operators developed for customers that they
knew (we recognize it was Bennett, rather
than Sarno who successfully repositioned
Circus Circus, few would accept that Bennett
could have conceived the concept.).
Ultimately when this was lost (such as when
Howard Hughes was the main acquirer) the
resorts’ quickly lost alignment with
customers and declined.
When The Mirage opened and the modern
integrated Las Vegas Strip resort was
dominant, for the first time international
gamblers and families shared amenities
under the same roof. Operators used external
design (Pyramids and Eiffel Towers) and
themes to differentiate their product.
Three key events took place between 1998
and 1999 that changed the way that Las
Vegas operated. These were the opening of
the Bellagio - a “mega-resort” targeted
exclusively for high-end gamers, The
Venetian opened, where gaming was only one
of several key revenue drivers and Gary
Loveman joined Harrah’s bringing a
“structured” approach to marketing the
product by using data to segment and focus
on customer equity.
The outcome of the 2000s was rapid
development, but many of the successful
resorts during this period focused on
identifying their customer and developing a
specialized segmented offering (such as the
Palms) and those that reverted to
differentiation by theme alone, such as the
Aladdin, failed.
With the information obtained throughout
this research we identify five strategies that
Las Vegas operators must recognize and
understand:
• Dalitz-Wynn
• Sarno-Boyd
• Binion-Rust
• Outside-In/Blattberg
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•Bennett-Kerkorian(Inside-Out)
(See Figure 5)
Based on the intense competition and
nature of the product, a standalone price
leadership approach is not viable in Las Vegas
as it is in other products. Resorts that have
taken this approach require reorientation or
they will face closure.

Delivery
Resorts do not exist in a vacuum; if a
resort’s value proposition diminishes,
customers will migrate.
Some loyalty exists with frequent
customers as they have experienced different
resorts and made a decision based on
alignment, which could be based on a number
of factors from price to bars.
Customers in Las Vegas have a perception
of their own value, sometimes overinflating
their worth, sometimes not. This manifests
itself in expectation of a particular level of
service or “comp”, which if it falls short, will
leave the customer disenchanted.
The Caesars and MGM model of transparent
“comps” based on spend has its advantages,
but as some operators believe that all players
can be “bought”, the actual delivery of the
product and customer experience must not
disappoint and by judging on the findings
(56% had only had their expectations met
sometimes) there is certainly scope for
improvement.
Hashimoto is incorrect that service is the
only differentiator, but of the four key
influences, it is the easiest and least
expensive to improve.
Innovate
The prizes for innovation are great.
Whether innovation is a loyalty scheme, a
dancing fountain or a presence in Macau, to
be the first at something gives the operator a
period of competitive advantage.
Whilst counterintuitive to those schooled
on probability and careful decision-making,
the successes of Loveman, Wynn and Adelson
were based on taking a gamble and
innovating.
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Currently the smaller niche resorts have
focused on innovation in developing their
segmented strategies to compete against the
larger groups, seen in the Cosmopolitan,
Tropicana and Hard Rock. This is currently
offering them a series of short-term
competitive advantages within particular
segments.
Being the first has allowed LVS to take the
initiative and dominate the Asian market.
Across operators there needs to be a
refocus on creating and trialing innovative
projects and strategies, particularly within
the larger corporate gaming companies as the
prizes for innovation are worth the risk.

Export:
Conceptual Las Vegas is bigger than actual
Las Vegas.
PwC reports global gaming revenues are
expected to increase by 25% in the next 5
years. Based on one operator’s assessment
that, “gamers practice online and play for real
in Vegas” Las Vegas’ casino operators are in a
unique position to export and exploit their
intellectual property and proven strategies.
As we note from the Harrah’s/Caesars
growth, when there is a relationship between
customer and a local presence, the customer
is more likely to spend in a particular resort.
Las Vegas operators need to develop online
hosts to develop alignment with international
customers who play the free and real online
platforms. The online platform can be
accessed 365 days per year and allow
customer-operator interaction not just when
directly interfacing in Las Vegas.
3D software can render entire resorts to a
virtual platform, enabling an online gambler
to be able to walk down a virtual strip,
accessing the operators’ intellectual property,
but moreover allowing them to play an
operator’s tables or slots, see the Bellagio
fountains or watch a live-stream of Celine
Dion, creating a true 24 hours a day, 7 days a
week gaming and social media platform
available on PC, tablet of phone.
The failure to embrace and exploit global
markets accessible through the internet, even
outside of the US jurisdictions, is a clear
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omission by the key operators who are Las
Vegas casino centric.

Conclusions
We set out to understand how Las Vegas
operators achieve competitive advantage,
with loyalty as the key metric. We sought to
identify why customers make their decisions
in selecting Las Vegas resorts and how Las
Vegas operators target those customers, with
the hypothesis that the operators cannot
achieve loyalty in this competitive space.
We conclude that emotional loyalty is
unachievable, but forms of conditional
transactional and functional loyalty can be
gained within particular segments. The
challenge for operators is to understand their
customers enough to align the correct
strategy and achieve loyalty.
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Figures

Figure 1: Outside-In vs. Inside-Out Strategies (Day & Moorman)
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Figure 2: Las Vegas Strip Revenues 1984-2011 ($bn)
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Figure 3: Distribution of Revenues 1984-2011 on the Las Vegas Strip (%)
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Figure 4: The Drivers of Customer Decision Making
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Figure 5: Summary Outline of Strategies

Market Segment

Key Customer Decision
Making Influences
(Survey Defined)

High-End Gaming
Customer

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Bedroom Quality
Resort Appearance
Star Rating
Location
Player Club

Non-Traditional
Customers

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Location
Bedroom Quality
Resort Appearance
Friendliness of staff
Swimming pool

Frequent Gaming
Customers

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Players Club
Bedroom Quality
Resort Appearance
Friendliness of Staff
Choice of Games

OutsideIn/Blattberg

Understanding and
satisfying customer needs.
Delivering new value,
leverage brands and
assets, reinventing for
competitive advantage.

Existing Las Vegas
Customers

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Location
Players Club
Bedroom Quality
Resort Appearance
Friendliness of Staff.

Bennett-Kerkorian
(Inside-Out+)

Focusing on internal
expertise and identifying
segments.

All Customers, SelfSegmenting

Strategy

Features Of Strategy

Dalitz-Wynn

Market leading product
for high-end customer
base. The operator must
know the customer and
deliver on highest
standards.

Sarno-Boyd

Be different. Seek to
develop what is not in the
market already and
bringing in non-traditional
customers.

Binion-Rust

Looking at customer
lifetime value (customer
equity) seeking loyalty
through retention

N/A

Note: Bill Bennett was the owner/manager of Circus Circus and Mandalay Resort Groups between 1974-1995. He
developed resorts for specified segments, in particular grind players and families.

Lovat | Pyramids to Players Clubs

[21]

Works Cited
"COMPANY INFORMATION." Wynn Resorts Investor Relations. Web. 1 May 2012.
<http://phx.corporate-ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=132059&p=irol-IRHome>.

"COMPANY OVERVIEW." Company Overview. MGM Resorts. Web. 01 May 2012.
<http://mgmresorts.com/company/company-overview.aspx>.

"Investor Relations." Caesars Entertainment Corporation -. Web. 01 May 2012.
<http://investor.caesars.com/>.

"Research Stats & Facts - LVCVA.com." LVCVA.com - Official Site for Las Vegas Meetings and Travel
Professionals. Web. 12 Sept. 2011. <http://www.lvcva.com/press/statistics-facts/index.jsp>.
"The Venetian - Resort, Hotel, Casino." Las Vegas Sands. Web. 01 May 2012.

<http://www.lasvegassands.com/LasVegasSands/Corporate_Overview/About_Us.aspx>.

Atherton, Mike. Gambling. London: Hodder Paperbacks, 2007. Print.

Ayling, Stuart. "Getting More Loyalty From Clients." Web log post. Marketing Advisor Update. 23
Jan. 2006. Web. 3 May 2012. <http://marketingnous.blogspot.co.uk/2006/01/getting-more-loyaltyfrom-clients.html>.

Benston, Liz. "Everything Las Vegas Issue # 766." Everything Las Vegas. 17 Aug. 2011. Web. 01 Mar.
2012. <http://www.everythinglv.com/forums/content.php?182-Everything-Las-Vegas-issue-766>.

Benston, Liz. "Will Vegas Advertising That Worked Before, Work Again?"LasVegasSun.com. 27 Sept.
2009. Web. 22 Feb. 2012. <http://www.lasvegassun.com/news/2009/sep/27/will-vegas-advertisingworked-work-again/>.

Bernhard, B. Green, MS, Lucas AF. "From Maverick to Mafia to MBA : Gaming Industry Leadership
in Las Vegas from 1931 through 2007" Cornell Hospitality Quarterly 2008 49: 177 Available at
http://cqx.sagepub.com/content/49/2/177

Binkley, Christina. Winner Takes All: Steve Wynn, Kirk Kerkorian, Gary Loveman, and the Race to
Own Las Vegas. New York: Hyperion, 2008. Print.

Blattberg, Robert C., Gary Getz, and Jacquelyn S. Thomas. Customer Equity: Building and Managing
Relationships as Valuable Assets. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School, 2001. Print.
Denscombe, Martyn. Good Research Guide: for Small-scale Social Research Projects. Buckingham:
Open University, 2010. Print.

Denton, Sally, and Roger Morris. The Money and the Power: the Making of Las Vegas and Its Hold on
America, 1947-2000. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2001. Print.

Earley, Pete. Super Casino: inside the "New" Las Vegas. New York: Bantam, 2000. Print.

Fenez, Marcel. PwC Global Gaming Outlook. Rep. Print.

[22]

Occasional Papers | Center for Gaming Research | University of Nevada, Las Vegas

Grant, Robert M. Contemporary Strategy Analysis. Malden, MA: Blackwell Pub., 2008. Print.

Griffin, Dennis N. The Battle for Las Vegas. Las Vegas, NV: Huntington, 2006. Print.

Hashimoto, Kathryn. Casino Management: a Strategic Approach. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson
Prentice Hall, 2008. Print.

Heskett, James L., and W. Earl Sasser and Joe Wheeler. "The Ownership Quotient: Putting the
Service Profit Chain to Work for Unbeatable Competitive Advantage. Journal of Service
Management 21.3 (2010): 413-17. Print.

Johnson, Gerry, Kevan Scholes, and Richard Whittington. Exploring Corporate Strategy. New York:
Prentice Hall, 2006. Print.

Kennedy, Eileen Nancy . An empirical analysis of the reasons why guests select and return to Las
Vegas hotel/casino properties. MA Thesis, University of Nevada, Las Vegas, 1998.
Kurtzman, Joel. Common Purpose: How Great Leaders Get Organizations to Achieve the
Extraordinary. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2010. Print.

Loveman, Gary. "Diamonds in the Data Mine." Harvard Business Review (2003): 109-13. UNLV. Web.
<http://faculty.unlv.edu/wrewar_emba/WebContent/Loveman_DataMining.pdf>.
May, Tim. Social Research: Issues, Methods and Process. Buckingham [UK: Open UP, 2001.] Print.

McNeill, Patrick. Research Methods. London: Tavistock Publications, 1990. Print.

Pileggi, Nicholas. Casino: Love and Honor in Las Vegas. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995. Print.

Porter, Michael E. Competitive Strategy: Techniques for Analyzing Industries and Competitors. New
York: Free, 1980. Print.

Rankin, Jay. Under the Neon Sky: A Las Vegas Doorman's Story. United States: Jay Rankin, 2009.
Print.

Robinson, Sionade, and Lyn Etherington. Customer Loyalty: a Guide for Time Travellers. New York:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2006. Print.
Rumelt, Richard. Good Strategy Bad Strategy: The Difference and Why It Matters. Crown Group,
2011. Print.
Rust, Roland T., Valarie A. Zeithaml, and Katherine N. Lemon. Driving Customer Equity: How
Customer Lifetime Value Is Reshaping Corporate Strategy. New York: Free, 2000. Print.

Schumacher, Geoff. Sun, Sin & Suburbia: an Essential History of Modern Las Vegas. Las Vegas, NV:
Stephens, 2004. Print.

Schwartz, David G. Suburban Xanadu: the Casino Resort on the Las Vegas Strip and Beyond. New
York: Routledge, 2003. Print.

Lovat | Pyramids to Players Clubs

[23]

Schwartz David G. Nevada Casinos: Departmental Revenues, 1984-2011. Las Vegas: Center for
Gaming Research, University Libraries, University of Nevada Las Vegas, 2012.
Sheehan, Jack, and Geoff Schumacher. Forgotten Man: How Circus Circus's Bill Bennett Brought
Middle America to Las Vegas. Las Vegas, NV: Stephens, 2010. Print.

Sheehan, Jack. The Players: the Men Who Made Las Vegas. Reno: University of Nevada, 1997. Print.

Shook, Robert L. Jackpot: Harrah's Winning Secrets for Customer Loyalty. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley
& Sons, 2003. Print.

Smith, John L. Running Scared: the Life and Treacherous Times of Las Vegas Casino King Steve
Wynn. New York: Barricade, 1995. Print.
Solomon, Michael R. Marketing: Real People, Real Decisions. Harlow: Prentice Hall, 2009. Print.

Southgate, Anna. Casino Games. Guilford, CT: Lyons, 2006. Print.

Wilson, Alan. Services Marketing: Integrating Customer Focus across the Firm. London: McGraw-Hill
Education, 2008. Print.

[24]

Occasional Papers | Center for Gaming Research | University of Nevada, Las Vegas

About the Center for Gaming Research
Located within Special Collections at UNLV's state-of-the-art Lied Library, the Center for
Gaming Research is committed to providing support for scholarly inquiry into all aspects of
gaming. Through its website, http://gaming.unlv.edu, the Center offers several unique
research tools and information sources.
About the University of Nevada, Las Vegas
UNLV is a doctoral-degree-granting institution of 28,000 students and 3,300 faculty and
staff. Founded in 1957, the university offers more than 220 undergraduate, masters and
doctoral degree programs. UNLV is located on a 332-acre campus in dynamic Southern
Nevada and is classified in the category of Research Universities (high research activity) by
the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching.

